This study examines the relationship between information asymmetry (bid-ask spread) and various activities that are widely thought to be responsible for bank opacity. Using a sample of 275 U.S. commercial banks listed on the NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX from Q4-1999 to Q2-2012, I find various on-and off-balance sheet activities of banks to be positively related to information asymmetry -suggesting these are sources of bank opacity. Banks' off-balance sheet (over-thecounter) derivative exposure stand out as particularly important -their economic impact on information asymmetry is significantly higher than for on-balance sheet activities. The evidence found in this study supports regulatory efforts to push banks into moving their on-and offbalance sheet trading activities onto clearinghouses, where prices can be monitored.
I. INTRODUCTION "Sovereign wealth funds should be transparent but the banks who want capital injections must also be transparent… If foreign investors do not know whether they will show the balance sheets of all the information they find it difficult to invest."
Liqun Jin, Chairman of the Board of Supervisors at China Investment Corporation 17 October 2011, Reuters
Although deregulation of financial markets began in the 1970s, there are two major regulatory changes in the U.S. banking industry in the late 1990s that radically changed the operations of commercial banks. In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency (RNA) Act 1 allowed all national commercial banks to operate branches across state boundaries. This is followed by the 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLBA) Act, 2 which removed business operation restrictions on all types of banking and financial institutions. In an attempt to increase profitability, the banking industry transformed itself into a more flexible commercial banking prototype -banks loaned and securitized, innovated and interconnected, swapped and reinsured, and hedged and guaranteed. Over time, this transformation has resulted in an explosion in both income sources and risks for banks, derived mostly from securitization and trading book activities (DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Allen and Santomero, 1999) . 3 Such activities are thought to 1 The Riegle-Neal Act allowed banks, under certain circumstances, to acquire banks or set up branches in other states without creating a separate subsidiary. The Act streamlined banking regulation in the United States, and, for the first time, allowed out-of-state residents to set up bank accounts. It also gave federal regulators the authority to ensure that out-of-state deposits do not dominate American banking. 2 Also known as the Financial Services Modernization (FSM) Act of 1999, it repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 by removing barriers in the market among banking, securities, and insurance companies that prohibited any one institution from acting as any combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance company. With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies were allowed to consolidate. 3 The business of banks has also been taken up by non-banks in the "shadow-banking" sector, creating unregulated and uninsured exposures. This added complexity has made the job of boards and managers difficult for many reasons. First, the number of activities to manage has multiplied. Second, the knowledge needed to understand these activities has also increased substantially. Third, techniques used to manage these activities (such as value at risk have increasingly compromised the financial transparency of banks, resulting in a highly opaque banking sector and an erosion of trust in the financial sector as a whole.
Opacity is where there is ambiguity about the profits-and-loss probability density function (risks) ex ante so that ex post, in a bad outcome, actual losses are likely to become the subject of considerable conflict and controversy. The opposite of opacity is "transparency". A transparent investment is when the provider of the capital is well informed ex ante of the payoff distribution, and fully consents to bear the risks to which her capital is employed. This definition characterizes opacity largely in terms of ambiguity about risk ex ante. In the finance industry, opacity is more commonly understood to mean a lack of available credible information. For banking stocks, it includes a lack of information on the credit score of borrowers (loans) as well as on the trading assets of banks, especially those that are primarily traded in opaque over-the-counter (OTC) markets 4 . It also relates to a bank's exposure to highly volatile capital market activities, making the bank's position in trading assets highly liquid and hard to track (Myers and Rajan, 1998; Morgan, 2002) . 5, 6 Last but not least, the increased connectivity between banks as a result of financial innovation has made it ever more unclear to work out where the credit risk lies.
A lack of available credible information leads to information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and a divergence in opinions between outsiders (such as investors, credit rating (VaR) in the case of risk management and credit ratings for capital requirements) have not performed well under the greater degree of complexity and duress (http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr502.pdf). 4 These include subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), swaps, and repos. 5 Myers and Rajan (1998) call this the paradox of liquidity -the increased asset liquidity and trading shrink a bank's debt capacity because the risk of trading banks is hard to track. 6 Trading not only creates information asymmetry between bank managers and investors, but also between bank's traders and their managers who may have little idea of the risk the bank's traders, particularly derivatives traders, take (Hentschel and Smith, 1996) . Further, high leverage may tempt banks to take excessive risk since the risk is born more by the creditors or their insurers.
agencies, financial analysts, debt holders) 7 about the true value of the firm. Given that increased financial disclosure lessens information opacity, this should lead to less ambiguity about the true value of the firm. 8 However, based on agency theory related to adverse selection and moral hazard, bank managers are thought to encourage opacity because it assists them to hoard information about shifts in the bank's income sources and risk-taking 9 -the incentives for bank managers to take undue risks are high because of high potential payoffs and the costs are not borne by them but by equity/bond holders instead. It also creates an incentive for bank managers to corrupt regulators and to share in the proceeds, which in turn creates an incentive for regulators to encourage opacity since this makes it easier for them to claim they were trying to do their job but things got too complicated (O'Neil, 2012) .
Motivated by the fact that it is imperative for outsiders to precisely assess profitability and risk of banks and that opacity hinders this process, this paper examines the various on-and offbalance sheet lending and trading activities of banks as potential sources of bank opacity. Onbalance sheet activities examined include: (i) secured loans from banks' lending book; (ii) various phases of troubled loans; and (iii) loan securitization from the trading book. Off-balance sheet activities examined consist of (i) derivative exposures; (ii) net use of derivatives held (hedging vs.
trading purposes); (iii) positive and negative fair values of marked-to-market derivative 7 Bank depositors may care less about opacity because they are almost entirely (up to US$250,000) protected through deposit insurance. Only when depositors absorb losses would they realistically care about the credit worthiness of the bank. In theory, the risk (e.g. of loan nonpayment) is borne first by bank's equity holders, then by bank bond holders, then by uninsured depositors, and then by the complicated web of taxpayers and other-bank stakeholders who back a deposit insurance fund, and then finally on holders of inflation-susceptible liabilities (which include bank depositors). 8 While regulators, who police the intermediaries, may briefly pierce the veil of opacity through quarterly examinations of bank lending and trading activities, such detailed data remain largely unavailable to other outsiders (primarily bank equity holders and bond holders) who suffer most from opacity. 9 Behr, Bannier, and Guttler (2010) investigates whether bank opacity leads to bank risk taking since more opaque banks are more likely to hide their risky activities than less opaque banks. Using a cross-country sample of 199 banks from 38 countries over the period January 1996 to December 2006, he finds tentative, but not conclusive, evidence that bank opacity (proxied by split ratings) is significantly related to bank risk taking (proxied by Merton's probability of default and bank z-score).
exposure; (iv) swaps exposure; and (v) net credit exposure. 10 For each bank activity, I examine total exposure as well as exposure by asset type since this allows me to test whether opacity of banks is common to all items or driven by certain asset categories.
My proxy for information asymmetry is the (intraday) bid-ask spread. Based on market microstructure theory, if outside investors find it difficult to value banks and disagree on firm value or performance, the bid-ask spread should increase to reflect this fact. I conduct my tests around quarterly earnings announcements, which are by far the most important corporate event and should therefore witness heightened activity of informed trading. Although the timing of earnings announcements is predictable, there is voluminous literature tracing back to the seminal paper by Ball and Brown (1968) , which shows these corporate announcements convey price relevant information. Importantly, information asymmetry has been found to be greatest during this time of the year when compared to "normal" periods, suggesting a window of opportunity for informed traders to profit on their private information. 11 Hence, unlike other studies that take the average (daily) bid-ask spread over the year, my measure of bid-ask spread taken around quarterly earnings announcements should provide a more accurate proxy of information asymmetry.
Based on a large sample of 275 U.S. commercial banks from Q4-1999 to Q2-2012, I find higher information asymmetry around earnings announcements for banks that are exposed to 10 The recent financial crisis has, however, highlighted that banks and derivatives markets deserve more reflection and reform for two reasons. First, financial innovation from banks -the design of new, customized productstypically occurs in the OBS space, where banks tailor their own risk-taking and leverage build up. However, most of these positions are OTC. This is especially true because regulatory capital requirements are not suitably adjusted to reflect all aspects of OBS or OTC derivatives exposures, such as their illiquidity, counterparty and systemic risks. The lack of such adjustment implies that risk-taking is often more attractive for banks through OBS than on-balance sheet or exchange-traded products. The second concern is about opacity and exposures in OTC derivatives. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the hypotheses and Section 3 outlines the sample selection procedures and research method. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4, with a conclusion provided in Section 5.
II. HYPOTHESES
My first hypothesis relates to bank's on-balance sheet lending book. Banks are informationally opaque because of the loans they hold. Diamond (1984 Diamond ( , 1989 Diamond ( , 1991 and others (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Berlin and Loeys, 1988) argue that the role of banks is to screen and monitor borrowers so that outsiders (i.e. investors, depositors, and other lenders) do not have to. If banks are doing their job as delegated monitors, they should know more about the credit risk of their borrowers than outsiders (Morgan, 2002) . The fact that investors bid up a bank's share price after the bank loan commitment is renewed suggests that banks are better informed about their borrowers than market participants (James, 1987 By definition, when a loan is not performing it becomes non-performing loan, and if a non-performing loan is 90-days or more past-due and still non-accrual then it becomes past-due and non-accrual loan. Further if a past-due or non-accrual is still not performing then bank restructure these loans and then report under restructured loans. Finally, when a loan default occurs then banks write-off these loans to remove it from their balance sheet. 13 Securitized mortgages are known as mortgaged-backed securities, while securitized assets (non-mortgage loans or assets with expected payments streams) are known as asset-backed securities.
thought to be a means of "arbitraging" regulatory capital requirements by keeping risky assets on the balance sheet of the so-called "special purpose vehicles" (SPV) instead of their own (Calomiris, 2009 (Calomiris, , 2010 Calomiris and Mason, 2004) . 14 By transferring risky capital off the balance sheet, banks are able (on paper) to maintain lower regulatory capital and appear less risky. Calomiris and Mason (2004) find securitization results in some transfer of risk out of the originating bank, and that the risk remains in the securitizing bank as a result of implicit recourse. Based on these results, they suggest that securitization with implicit recourse provides an important means of avoiding minimum capital requirements for banks. The additional equity capital and earnings gained from securitization may exacerbate opacity in financial reporting and provides a misleading picture about bank capital, performance, and underlying risk. 15 Second, banks rely on "soft" information to grant and manage loans. Since this information cannot be credibly transmitted to the market when loans are securitized, banks may lack the incentives to screen borrowers at origination or to keep monitoring them once the loan has been securitized (Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008) . Third, although securitization of loans is a major source of non-interest income against illiquid loan portfolios, it may create severe market and credit risk exposures for banks. To balance the originated liquidity with bank exposure to market and credit risk from securitization, banks engage in highly liquid and volatile trading activities. These trading activities offset the liquidity risk exposures originated from securitization but at the cost of additional market risk exposure and pressure of performance by trading managers which in turn result in them taking on aggressive and additional risk. To offset 14 Several capital requirements for the treatment of securitized assets originated by banks and for debts issued by those conduits and held or guaranteed by banks were specifically and consciously designed to permit banks to allocate less capital against their risks if they had been held on their balance sheets (Calomiris, 2008) . In short, while securitization and leveraged trading exposures create new sources of cash flow, they come at the cost of excessive risk and complex financial arrangements. These have the consequence of making it increasingly difficult (or say practically impossible) to accurately assess the true value bank assets, performance, and risk. Therefore, I predict:
There is a positive relationship between information asymmetry and banks' securitization activities.
H4: There is a positive relationship between information asymmetry and banks' on-/off-
balance sheet trading activities.
III. DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD
My focus is on those financial institutions which are insured or supervised by 
The dependent variable is information asymmetry (Info.Asymm) surrounding the earnings announcement, and is proxied by the bid-ask spread (BAS):
where Bid and Ask are the average value of the 5-minute bid and ask quotes from nine days before to nine days after the announcement day. When the earnings announcement is after the close of trading, I take the next trading day to be day 0, consistent with Berkman and Truong (2009). Following Bagehot (1971) , I propose that market makers trade with two kinds of traders, informed traders and liquidity traders. The higher the bid-ask spread of a bank's equity, the smaller the number of liquidity creators (uninformed traders) trading the stock. While the market maker loses to informed traders, he recoups these losses from uninformed traders by increasing the bid-ask spread. Thus, the higher the level of information asymmetry, the greater the bid-ask spread (buyers-sellers stock price disagreement).
The first source of bank opacity is loans secured by, (i) farmland properties; (ii) 1-4 family residential properties; (iii) multi-family (>4) residential properties; and (iv) commercial properties; as a percentage of total assets. The second source of bank opacity is the various phases of troubled loans. The first stage is when loan placed into bank's non-accruals as a nonperforming loan which will default as a percentage of total loans and leases. The next phase is past due loans and is measured by the ratio of all loans that are 90-days plus past due and nonaccruals to as a percentage of total loans and leases. Rather than summing up the two phases of problematic loans, I use the FDIC guided Texas ratio as a proxy for bank overall troubled loans.
According to the definition by FDIC call reports, Texas ratio is determined by dividing bank nonperforming assets (excluding government sponsored non-performing loans) by tangible common equity and loan loss reserves. As an early indicator of bank trouble, the higher this ratio, the more precarious the bank's financial situation.
To examine bank securitization activities as a source of bank opacity, total securitized assets available for sale as a percentage of gross managed assets is computed. Since not all banks are involved in securitization, a dummy variable is created which takes the value of 1 if the bank is involved in securitization and zero otherwise. I also compute securitization by category in order to determine which type contributes most to bank opacity. I employ bank's securitized securities backed by: (i) family residential loans; (ii) home equity lines; (iii) credit card receivables loans; (iv) auto loans; and (v) commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of gross managed assets.
The remaining opacity drivers are off-balance sheet (OBS) activities, measured by (i) net exposure to exchange (or OTC) traded derivatives; 19 (ii) interest rate derivatives; and (iii) foreign exchange rate derivatives; as a percentage of total assets. These activities are expected to be positively related to information asymmetry because OTC contracts are privately negotiated contracts with very lax regulatory supervision requiring no disclosure to or monitoring by the clearinghouse. I also examine marked-to-market gross notional amount of (i) equity contracts;
(ii) commodities and others contracts; (iii) interest rate contracts; and (iv) foreign exchange rate contracts as a percentage of total assets. In addition, I examine marked-to-market derivative exposures to positive (and negative) fair value of derivatives contracts. Gross negative fair value is the sum of the fair values of contracts where the bank owes money to its counter-parties without taking into account netting. This represents the maximum losses the bank's counterparties would incur if the bank were to default and there is no netting of contracts, and no bank collateral was held by the counter-parties. Conversely, the gross positive fair value is the sum of the fair values of contracts where the bank is owed money by its counter-parties, without taking into account netting. This represents the maximum losses a bank could incur if all its counterparties were to default and there is no netting of contracts, and the bank holds no counter-party collateral.
The final set of off-balance sheet derivatives used as a source of bank opacity is equity, commodities and others, interest rate, and foreign exchange rate, swaps written/purchased and net OBS credit derivatives exposure, as a percentage of total assets. Detailed descriptions of the variables used in the regressions are summarized in Appendix C (available on request).
A number of variables that have been shown to impact information asymmetry in past studies are also controlled for in the tests. The first control variable is regulatory capital quality enforcements in the form of capital adequacy ratio (CAR), a ratio specified by the Basel Committee (2008). Banks which maintain higher regulatory capital ratios are expected to be safer and are therefore associated with lower information asymmetry. I use total capital requirement reported to FDIC as it is the most stringent capital adequacy ratio. S&P credit quality rating (Ratings) is used as a proxy for banks overall credit health. Banks with a lower credit rating have a higher probability of default which should result in greater information asymmetry.
The qualitative credit ratings are converted to numerical values, with the highest credit rating (AAA) assigned with a score of 7 and credit ratings at or below "C" are assigned a value of one.
The information environment is expected to impact on information asymmetry and is thus also controlled for in the regression. The information environment is proxied by analyst following and bank size. Larger banks (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson, 2001 ) and banks that are followed by more analysts (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) have a richer information environment and thus lower information asymmetry.
Analyst Followings is computed as the natural logarithm of the total number of analysts covering a bank. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
As a long-run performance measure, Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of bank assets (as measured by the market value of outstanding stock and debt) to the replacement cost of bank assets (Tobin, 1969) . If Tobin's Q is greater (less) than 1, it implies that the bank is over (under) valued in the market. A higher Tobin's Q indicates either outsiders are not able to value the bank assets and underlying risks correctly or the bank is performing very well. However, the probability of wrong valuation is higher because of banks' reporting opacity and risky business lines. Therefore, a positive relationship between Tobin's Q and information asymmetry is expected.
Stock price (Price), return volatility (Sigma), and trading volume (Volume) control for outsiders' equity valuation, risk, and liquidity respectively. I expect a positive relationship between information asymmetry and stock price volatility, and a negative relationship between information asymmetry and trading volume. Stock price controls for the fact that higher priced stocks tend to have higher bid-ask spreads. I also include a Bad News dummy since investors respond to bad news more aggressively relative to good news and the effect of their reaction remains in the market for a longer period compared to good news (Lakhal, 2008) . Bad News is equal to 1 if this quarter EPS is less than last quarter EPS, and zero otherwise. Finally, an NYSE dummy is included to control for the relatively higher disclosure requirements on NYSE, which suggests lower information asymmetry for NYSE-listed banks. Panel C shows secured and non-performing loans by category. Net secured loans make up 17.83% of total assets (on average) whereas average loans and leases make up 63.34% of total assets (on average). Of the four categories of secured loans, the largest category is commercial loans (15.89% of total assets), followed by 1-4 residential properties backed loans (5.01% of total assets) and >4 residential properties backed loans (1.33% of total assets). Lastly, loans secured by farmland properties make up just 0.87% of total assets. Of the three stages of nonperforming loans, non-accruals loans, past due loans and charge-off loans make up less than 1% of total loans, respectively. The maximum value of troubled loans is 2.00%. frequently, with a notional value below 5% of gross assets. The net positive (negative) fair value of derivatives used is 0.09% (0.09%) of gross assets and much smaller than the notional amounts. Primarily this is because derivatives involve a future exchange of payments and fair value is the net present value of the exchange (for forwards, futures, and swaps, contracts are set so that values are initially zero). In contrast, notional amounts relate to payment obligations based on one side of the contract. Difference between positive and negative fair value is net fair value and are even smaller. One is that institutions substantially hedge their derivatives exposures, holding long and short positions on the same market exposures. This would be expected to be typical of bank dealers in derivatives whose income is generated mainly from market-making activity. A second hedging reason is that undertaking a hedge on an outstanding derivatives position provides the bank with a way of closing out a market exposure without having to sell the instrument. Also, different derivatives will have exposures to different markets, which may move in different directions and thus create both positive and negative market values among different exposures.
In sum, the descriptive statistics show that those banks that are involved in securitization and derivatives activities have high exposures, on average. Table 2 presents the panel regression results of the impact of the first two sources of opacity, secured loans from the bank's lending book and various stages of troubled loans, on the proxy for information asymmetry -the bid-ask spread. From policy prospective, banks as delegated monitors, are supposed to screen and monitor borrowers so that outsiders do not have to (Diamond, 1984) . If banks are doing their jobs, they should know more about the credit risk of their borrowers than outsiders. This makes loans opaque to outsiders. Consistent with the hypotheses, there is statistically significant positive relationship between the secured loans and bid-ask spread (regressions 1 to 5) and non-performing loans and bid-ask spread (regressions 6 to 10). These results confirm that bank's loans are at the core of bank's opacity, irrespective whether loans are performing or non-performing. The results are also economically significant. Table 3 shows the results for securitization activities as a source of bank opacity. The types of assets involved in securitization transactions are primarily bank's receivables, i.e., banks convert its illiquid assets (primarily loans) to highly liquid trading assets (e.g. residential mortgage backed securities and CDOs) by pooling them together to create investment tranches for outsiders. 22 While securitization results in some transfer of risk out of the originating bank, risk remains in the securitizing bank as a result of implicit recourse (Calomiris and Mason, 2004) .
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Securitization provides an important means of avoiding minimum capital requirements for banks, and may exacerbate opacity in financial reporting. Banks may lack the incentives to screen borrowers at origination or to keep monitoring them once the lending has been securitized.
Further, securitization leads banks into extensive use of complex off-balance sheet derivatives and swaps trading. There is a positive relationship between the net securitization dummy and the bid-ask spread, suggesting that banks that are involved in securitization have significantly higher information asymmetry (by 1.54 cents, on average). The continuous variable for net securitization is also significantly positively related to the bid-ask spread -banks with higher exposure to securitized assets (as a percentage of total managed assets) have higher information asymmetry. Focusing on each of the five securitization categories, there is a statistically significant coefficient for securitization of family residential loans and auto loans only. As noted in the descriptive statistics, family residential loans are the most common securitized assets that banks are involved with. Commercial and industrial loans backed securitization has no statistically significant impact on the bid-ask spread suggesting that these are not a source of bank opacity. Table 4 shows the results for the impact of OBS derivatives trading activities on information asymmetry. A series of spectacular losses by rogue traders has highlighted the risk associated with high-leverage trading by banks. Therefore, the more banks are involved in derivatives activities, the higher the bid-ask spread. This is particular so for derivatives that are 22 The practice of securitization originated with the sale of securities backed by residential mortgages. However, nowadays a wide variety of assets are securitized, including lease, auto loan, credit card receivables, and commercial loans.
traded OTC. As expected, net exposure and foreign exchange rate exposure to OTC traded derivatives is significantly positively related to the bid-ask spread, consistent with its opaque nature. Irrespective whether derivatives are used for hedging or trading purposes, there is a significant positive relationship between the bank's (equity, commodity, interest and foreign exchange) derivatives exposure and the bid-ask spread. For example, a one percent increase in exposure to equity derivatives for hedging (trading) purposes, increases the bid-ask spread by 3.66 (0.511) cents. While theoretically, hedging reduces risk (and therefore the bid-ask spread), banks with higher exposure to derivatives for hedging purposes are also likely to be (1) more involved in market-making; and (2) have higher risk exposures to the assets that are being
hedged. Both these activities should results in larger bid-ask spreads. 23 Overall, the results suggest that OBS derivatives exposure is a significant source of bank opacity. Table 5 presents evidence on the relationship between positive and negative fair value (marked-to-market) derivatives exposure and the bid-ask spread. Gross negative fair value represents the maximum losses the bank's counter-parties would incur if the bank defaults, while gross positive fair value represents the maximum losses a bank could incur if all its counterparties default. Both gross positive and negative fair value of equity, commodity and foreign exchange derivatives are positively relative to the bid-ask spread. That the regression coefficients for positive fair value are much larger than for negative fair value is because with positive fair values banks act as guarantors. There is no significant relationship between positive or negative fair value of interest rate derivatives and the bid-ask spread. Table 6 presents the results for bank's exposure to OBS swaps. Net swap exposure is significantly positively related to the bid-ask spread, with every one percent increase in bank 23 The hedging activity of banks may give outsiders an indication of the trading exposure of banks.
exposure increasing the bid-ask spread by 0.05 cents. For the individual categories, only the coefficients for interest rate swaps and foreign exchange rate swaps are significantly positive.
Since the results may be driven by a few large banks, which have very significant exposure to securitization and OBS trading, I rerun the robustness tests by dividing the sample of banks into two categories. The first category includes banks who are supposed to be too big to fail with total assets exceeding US$100 billion. The second category belongs to those banks with total assets less than US$100 billion. Consistent with Adrian et al. (2009a Adrian et al. ( , 2009b , Table 7 shows that the results are not driven by big commercial banks, with all commercial banks involved in highly opaque activities such as loans and OBS derivatives exposure.
V. CONCLUSION
This study combines the literature on bank opacity and market microstructure to assess whether on-and off-balance sheet sources of bank opacity are positively related to level of information asymmetry. I use quarterly earnings announcements as the event to capture the effects on information asymmetry. Using a large sample of 275 U.S. commercial banks listed on the NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX for Q4-1999 to Q2-2012, I find bank sources of bank opaqueness such as secured and troubled loans, securitization, and OBS derivatives exposure are positively related to the level of information asymmetry. In particular, OBS derivatives exposures held for hedging purposes has a higher economic significance with information asymmetry compared to derivatives held for trading purposes. This result implies that outside investors are uncertain on true value of banks underlying loans and hedging position. As expected, OTC derivatives exposure significantly contributes to information asymmetry. It confirms that the proposed move of derivatives trading from OTC onto clearinghouses, where prices can be monitored, is a good initiative as it should reduce bank opacity. Interestingly, banks gross negative fair value exposure to derivatives held for hedging purpose is economically more significantly related with bid-ask spread compared to gross positive fair value exposure to derivatives held for hedging purpose. Of significance, this result re-affirms that banks are informationally more opaque than their counter parties and outsiders are probably more uncertain to scale banks' exposure to default. In general,
OBS interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives exposures stand out as particularly important -their economic impact on information asymmetry is higher as compared to other derivatives exposures. Regulatory capital requirements provide a cushion to investors as it reduces the level of information asymmetry.
An important policy implication that flows from my results is that bank regulators and lawmakers should develop risk reporting standards that contribute to a more transparent information environment for market participants. Of economic significance, bank's trading activities needs to be better regulated and requires additional screening. Greater information transparency may also have a positive impact on market discipline, which may further help to reduce bank failures. It can be done by pushing banks to move their trading activities onto clearinghouses rather than OTC or privately negotiated trades, where prices can be monitored, while demanding completer disclosure on loans, mortgages, securitization and OBS derivatives exposures. 
